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Ice, Ice, Baby! The Division of Frozen Embryos at 
the Time of Divorce  
Meagan R. Marold* 
The difficulty of IVF or of any fertility issues is the hope and the 
shattered hope, the dream that it might happen this time and then it 
doesn’t happen.1 
I.INTRODUCTION 
For someone who desperately wants a child, the thought of infertility can 
be daunting, depressing, and disheartening.  With more and more women 
marrying later or delaying pregnancies in order to make educational and 
career advances,2 the possibility of not being able to conceive a child grows 
with each passing year.  “A woman’s fertility drops off beginning in her late 
twenties, continues to fall even more dramatically after the age of thirty-five, 
and plummets when she reaches forty.”3  Fortunately, with over ten percent 
of American women suffering from some sort of fertility problem,4 there are 
 
*Meagan R. Marold is a graduate of St. Mary’s University School of Law. She is a part-
ner at Marold Law Firm where she practices probate, guardianship, family law, and estate 
litigation. She would like to thank the Volume 15 Editorial Board of The Scholar: St. Mary’s 
Law Review on Race and Social Justice for honing her skills; Professor Laura Burney for her 
knowledge and insight into making this article come to life; and, her husband and law partner, 
Burke Marold, for all of his love and support. 
 1. See Heidi Brockmyre, 5 Steps to Overcome Feeling Isolated While Trying to Get 
Pregnant, ZEN FERTILITY CENTER (June 20, 2012), http://www.zenfertility.com/fertility-
education-and-treatment/5-steps-to-overcome-feeling-isolated-while-trying-to-get-pregnant/ 
(quoting Brooke Shields).  
 2. See T.J. Mathews & Brady E. Hamilton, Delayed Childbearing: More Women Are 
Having Their First Child Later In Life, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTHCARE SERVICES, 1 
(2009).  “The average age of first-time mothers increased by 3.6 years, from 21.4 years in 
1970 to 25.0 years in 2006.” Id.  
 3. NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL 
REGULATION 1 (2009).  “Once a woman turns thirty, her chances of getting pregnant decrease 
about 3–5 percent each year.  By the age of thirty, 7 percent of couples are infertile, and by 
the time they reach the age of forty, 33 percent of couples are infertile.”  Id.  See Elizabeth 
Gregory, Tighter Belts, Later Bumps, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2011), http://articles.latimes. 
com/2011/jan/09/opinion/la-oe-gregory-birthrate-20110109 (citing a survey indicating “7% 
of women will be infertile by age 29, 11% by age 34, 33% by 39, 50% by 41, 87% by 44, and 
almost all women thereafter”). 
 4. See Fast Stats: Infertility, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/fertile.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2013) (noting that 10.9% 
of American women, ages 15-44, suffer from an “impaired ability to have children”).  See 
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viable medical options that allow a woman to experience a pregnancy and 
give birth to a child.  
These options, known as Assisted Reproductive Technologies or ART, 
involve “surgically removing eggs from a woman’s ovaries, combining them 
with the sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the woman’s body.”5 
The most common forms of ART include in vitro fertilization,6 zygote 
intrafallopian transfer or tubal embryo transfer,7 gamete intrafallopian 
transfer,8 and intracytoplasmis sperm injection.9  
While these advances in medicine have created exciting new ways for 
couples to achieve their familial goals, ART has virtually dumbfounded the 
legal community regarding the disposition of frozen embryos at the time of 
divorce.  Who gets to keep the embryos?  Can that person use the embryos 
to have a baby?  This article seeks to address the ways in which state 
legislatures and courts have dealt with the issue of what happens to the frozen 
embryos when a couple divorces.  Part Two provides a broad overview of 
the history of ART and the more recent development of cryopreservation.  
Part Three delves deep into the approaches jurisdictions have taken in 
determining which party is to be awarded frozen embryos at the time of 
divorce: state statutes, the contractual approach, the contemporaneous 
 
also Reproductive Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc. 
gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/ (last updated Feb. 12, 2013) (indicating that “[a]bout one-
third of infertility cases are caused by women’s problems.  Another one-third of fertility 
problems are due to the man.  The other cases are caused by a mixture of male and female 
problems or by unknown problems.”). 
 5. Assisted Reproductive Technology, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/index.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2013).  ART does not include 
procedures such as intrauterine or artificial insemination, where only sperm is involved.  Id.  
Moreover, ART does not include “procedures in which a woman takes medicine only to 
stimulate egg production without the intention of having eggs retrieved.”  Id. 
 6. See Reproductive Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/ (last updated Feb. 12, 2013) (noting that in 
vitro fertilization or IVF “means fertilization outside the body”).  
[IVF] is often used when a woman’s fallopian tubes are blocked or when a 
man produces too few sperm. Doctors treat the woman with a drug that causes 
the ovaries to produce multiple eggs. Once mature, the eggs are removed from 
the woman. They are put in a dish in the lab along with the man’s sperm for 
fertilization. After 3 to 5 days, healthy embryos are implanted in the woman’s 
uterus. 
Id. 
 7. Id. (explaining that zygote intrafallopian transfer or tubal embryo transfer involves 
fertilization of the embryo in the laboratory similar to the procedure used in IVF, but instead 
of being transferred to the uterus, the “embryo is transferred to the fallopian tube instead…”).  
 8. Id. (indicating that a gamete intrafallopian transfer or GIFT “involves transferring eggs 
and sperm into the woman’s fallopian tube,” allowing for the eggs and sperm to fertilize inside 
of the woman’s body).  
 9. Id. (indicating that intracytoplasmis sperm injection or ICSI involves the injection of a 
single sperm into a mature egg, followed by the transfer of the embryo into the fallopian tube 
or uterus). This procedure “is often used for couples in which there are serious problems with 
the sperm. Sometimes it is also used for older couples or for those with failed IVF attempts.”  
Id. 
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mutual consent approach, and the balancing approach.  Part Four analyzes 
the pros and cons of each approach, while Part Five proposes a new way to 
undertake the division of frozen embryos at divorce with the parties’ fertility 
at the forefront of the analysis.  
II.ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
The first test tube baby, Louise Brown, was born in England in July 
1978.10  This medical phenomenon instilled a sense of hope in infertile 
couples around the globe that their baby too could be conceived in a petri 
dish.  Accordingly, “163,038 ART cycles were performed at 451 reporting 
clinics in the United States during 2011, resulting in 47,849 live births 
(deliveries of one or more living infants) and 61,610 live born infants.”11  
ART “includes all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are 
handled.”12  ART procedures, such as IVF “involve surgically removing eggs 
from a woman’s ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and 
returning them to the woman’s body.”13 
More recently, the process of cryopreservation has been used to preserve 
embryos for a future IVF cycle.14 Following fertilization of the egg with the 
sperm “the embryo is dehydrated, suspended in an aqueous medium, and 
treated with a cryopreservant to substitute for the water after dehydration.”15  
The embryo is then cooled, transferred to liquid nitrogen, and stored.16  When 
a woman decides she is ready to have a child, the embryo is taken out of 
storage, “rehydrated and rinsed of the cryopreservant” and implanted into 
the uterus of the woman.17 
 
 10. This Day in History: World’s First Test Tube Baby Born, http://www.history.com/ this-
day-in-history/worlds-first-test-tube-baby-born (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).  Louise was born 
via “caesarean section and weighed in at five pounds, [twelve] ounces.”  Id.  After years of 
infertility caused by Mrs. Brown’s blocked fallopian tubes, Mr. and Mrs. Brown were finally 
able to conceive after undergoing IVF with the help of IVF pioneers “British gynecologist 
Patrick Steptoe and scientist Robert Edwards.”  Id.  See Nicholas Wade, Pioneer of In Vitro 
Fertilization Wins Nobel Prize, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www. nytimes.com/2010/ 
10/05/health/research/05nobel.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (indicating that in 2010, Robert 
Edwards won the Nobel prize in physiology or medicine); Deborah Hastings, Where is 
World’s First ‘Test Tube’ Baby Now? AOL NEWS (Oct 4, 2010, 1:16 PM), 
http://www.aolnews.com/2010/10/04/where-is-louise-brown-worlds-first-test-tube-baby/ 
(noting that Louise Brown, now 34, lives a quiet life with her husband and son who was 
conceived and born naturally). 
 11. Assisted Reproductive Technology, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/index.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2013). 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  ART does not include “treatments in which only sperm are handled (i.e., 
intrauterine—or artificial—insemination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine 
only to stimulate egg production without the intention of having eggs retrieved.”  Id.  
 14. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 101 (2011).  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. 
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The cryopreservation process allows the woman more opportunities to 
get pregnant than implanting all of the freshly fertilized eggs at once inside 
of the uterus.18  Cryopreservation also reduces the possibility of multiple 
births and allows doctors to examine the embryos for the possibility of 
diseases.19  
Despite all of the reproductive possibilities that come from freezing 
embryos, these potentials for life come with a plethora of questions that have 
flabbergasted the legal community.  One such question being, what happens 
to them when a couple decides to get a divorce? 
III.THE DISPOSITION OF FROZEN EMBRYOS AT THE TIME 
OF DIVORCE 
With little regulation from the federal government and no United States 
Supreme Court cases addressing procreation within the context of IVF, state 
courts and state legislatures have attempted to tackle this difficult question.  
A few states have enacted statutes, while the remaining states allow judges 
to rule on the matter, using three very distinct frameworks.  
A. STATE STATUTES 
While few states have enacted statutes regarding the disposition of 
frozen embryos at the time of divorce, the legislation that has been passed 
offers insight and guidance for states considering similar regulations.  
Furthermore, these statutes provide couples, doctors, and lawyers with some 
direction, albeit foggy at best, for making informed decisions regarding what 
happens to frozen embryos when a couple divorces.  
1. California 
The California Health and Safety Code § 125315 mandates that a 
physician provide fertility treatment patients with information “to allow the 
individual to make an informed and voluntary choice regarding the 
disposition of any human embryos remaining following the fertility 
treatment.”20  These information forms must, at a minimum, “indicate the 
time limit on storage of embryos at the clinic or storage facility” and provide 
the couple with disposition options in the event one of the partners passes 
away, both of the partners pass away, the partners separate or divorce, and 
the partners abandon the embryos.21  
The couple may choose from the following options in the event the 
couple separates or divorces: make the embryos available to the female 
 
 18. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 14, at 101.  “Cryopreservation has the advantage 
of preserving the frozen embryos so that they can be used in different cycles, thereby 
increasing the potential for producing a pregnancy. Successful implantation is less likely 
during the drug-induced cycle necessary to harvest multiple eggs.”  Id. 
 19. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 14, at 101–02.  
 20. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 125315(a).  
 21. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 125315(b)(1)–(4). 
MAROLD MACRO 3.31 2.01 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2014  4:33 PM 
Summer 2014]     DIVISION OF FROZEN EMBRYOS IN DIVORCE 183 
partner, make the embryos available to the male partner, donate the embryos 
for research, donate the embryos to another individual or couple, or thaw the 
embryos and take no further action.22  The couple also has the opportunity to 
write in their own option as long as it is “clearly stated.”23  Moreover, a 
physician’s failure to provide a couple or individual undergoing fertility 
treatment with these documents “constitutes unprofessional conduct.”24  
However, a couple’s decision to actually fill out the form is completely 
voluntary.25 
2. Florida 
Florida’s Domestic Relations § 742.17 indicates a “couple and the 
treating physician shall enter into a written agreement that provides for the 
disposition of the commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm, and preembryos in 
the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any unforeseen 
circumstance.”26  This language recognizes the use of disposition agreements 
as binding, thus “allow[ing] people to conform their conduct to the rules set 
out by the legislature.”27 
However, unlike California’s statute, no options are listed for the couple 
to choose from, nor is the physician’s failure to provide this information of 
any consequence to him or her.  Furthermore, the statute provides “absent a 
written agreement, any remaining eggs or sperm shall remain under the 
control of the party that provides the eggs or sperm . . . [and] decision making 
authority regarding the disposition of preembryos shall reside jointly with 
the commissioning couple.”28  Unfortunately, this language provides little 
guidance for divorcing couples.   
3. Massachusetts 
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 111L § 4 indicates a physician 
“shall present the patient with the options of storing, donating to another 
person, donating for research purposes or otherwise disposing of or 
destroying any unused pre-implantation embryos, as appropriate.”29  Like 
Florida, there are no repercussions for Massachusetts doctors who fail to 
provide this information to their patients.  While this statute provides patients 
with some options, it does not suggest specific options for various 
disposition scenarios such as divorce.   
 
 22. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 125315(b)(3). 
 23. Id. 
 24. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 125315(a). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Florida’s Domestic Relations § 742.17. 
 27. Diane K. Yang, What’s Mine is Mine, But What’s Yours Should Also Be Mine: An 
Analysis of State Statutes that Mandate the Implantation of Frozen Embryos, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 
587, 628 (2002).  
 28. Florida’s Domestic Relations § 742.17. 
 29. MASS. GENERAL LAWS ch. 111L § 4(a). 
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4. North Dakota 
The North Dakota statute proves to be the most confusing and 
complicated of the lot.  It provides “[i]f a marriage is dissolved before 
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the former spouse is not a parent of 
the resulting child unless the former spouse consented in a record that if 
assisted reproduction were to occur after a divorce, the former spouse would 
be a parent of the child.”30  The statute goes on to say “[t]he consent of a 
woman or a man to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by that 
individual in a record at any time before placement of eggs, sperm, or 
embryos.  An individual who withdraws consent under this section is not a 
parent of the resulting child.”31  
The reading of the statute is troubling because the statute mentions 
consent to assisted reproduction, but makes no mention of consent to 
parenthood.32  This discrepancy begs the question of whether a former 
spouse may use the embryos to further a pregnancy against the other spouse’s 
wishes.  If this interpretation proves true, the spouse wanting to conceive will 
always prevail.33  This statute seems to force individuals to become parents 
against their wishes.  
5. Louisiana 
This statute is different from all of the others in that Louisiana finds 
frozen embryos to be people under the law.34  Accordingly, frozen embryos 
may only be used “for the support and contribution of the complete 
development of human in utero implantation”35 and may not be destroyed.36 
In the event a couple no longer wishes to use their frozen embryos, they 
 
 30. N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 14-20-64(1). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are 
Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57, 94 (2011).  
 33. Id. 
 34. L.A. STAT. ANN. 9:123.  “An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person 
until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at any other time 
when rights attach to an unborn child in accordance with law.”  Id. 
 35. L.A. STAT. ANN. 9:122.  
The use of a human ovum fertilized in vitro is solely for the support and 
contribution of the complete development of human in utero implantation. No 
in vitro fertilized human ovum will be farmed or cultured solely for research 
purposes or any other purposes. The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human 
ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited. 
Id. 
 36. L.A. STAT. ANN. 9:129.   
A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which shall not 
be intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or through 
the actions of any other such person. An in vitro fertilized human ovum that 
fails to develop further over a thirty-six hour period except when the embryo 
is in a state of cryopreservation, is considered non-viable and is not considered 
a juridical person. 
Id. 
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“shall be available for adoptive implantation.”37  If a couple has a dispute 
regarding the frozen embryos, Louisiana has indicated the “best interest of 
the in vitro fertilized ovum” standard should apply.38  While this statute is 
the most restrictive in terms of a couple’s options at the time of divorce, it is 
the most clear and unambiguous of the statutes.  It gives a couple their 
options, implantation or adoption, and provides the judicial standard to be 
used to solve disputes.   
B. THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH 
While the various pieces of legislation mentioned above have their 
pitfalls, it is clear that states that acknowledge disposition agreements will 
ensure a properly filled out agreement will be held valid and legally binding 
under the rules of contract law.  In order for a contract to be deemed valid 
and enforceable “(1) one party must make an ‘offer’ to the other, (2) which 
must then be ‘accepted’ by the other party, and (3) that offer and acceptance 
must be supported by an exchange of ‘consideration.’”39  In the realm of 
disposition agreements, an IVF clinic offers to perform the procedure, but 
places a condition on that offer if the couple disagrees to the use of the frozen 
embryos.40  The couple accepts the terms by signing the agreement, and a fee 
is paid to the IVF clinic as valid consideration for their services.41  The 
contractual approach holds a disposition agreement to be legally binding as 
long as the contract was formed in accordance with contract laws and no 
valid defenses come into play. 
Courts have had several opportunities to apply contract principles to 
couples’ signed agreements.  In Kass v. Kass,42 a New York case, Husband 
and Wife signed an informed consent form prior to undergoing IVF and 
indicated that in the event they did not want to use their frozen embryos to 
pursue a pregnancy, they wished the IVF program to use their frozen 
embryos for research and biological studies.43  The procedure resulted in nine 
embryos, four of which were transferred to Wife’s sister, and the remaining 
five were cryopreserved.44  Wife’s sister was unable to become pregnant and 
shortly thereafter, Wife filed for divorce and “request[ed] sole custody of the 
 
 37. L.A. STAT. ANN. 9:130.  
 38. L.A. STAT. ANN. 9:131. 
 39. Shelly R. Petralia, Resolving Disputes Over Excess Frozen Embryos Through the 
Confines of Property and Contract Law, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 128–29 (2002-03).  
 40. Id. at 129. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 696 N.E. 2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
 43. Id. at 177–78. 
 44. Id at 178.  See Linda Carroll, Doubly Blessed: Two Siblings Act as Surrogates for 
Sibling, TODAY.COM (Feb. 10, 2012, 8:59 AM), http://www.today.com/health/doubly-
blessed-two-sisters-act-surrogates-sibling-1C9381823 (offering a story of two sisters who 
agreed to serve as surrogates for their other sister who was unable to carry a child).  
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pre-zygotes so she could undergo another implantation procedure.”45  
Husband opposed Wife’s request and sought specific performance of the 
agreement, which stated any additional frozen embryos would be donated 
for research.46  
The Court of Appeals of New York, wishing to develop a clear and 
consistent rule, determined, “agreements between progenitors, or gamete 
donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be 
presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.”47  
While both parties agreed to the legal nature of the forms and “they were 
freely and knowingly made,” Wife argued the consent forms were “fraught 
with ambiguity” in regards to the intent of the parties.48  
Applying basic contract law, the court determined ambiguity by looking 
within the four corners of the consent form document.49  The court paid 
particular attention to the inclusive language of the agreement, such as “[w]e 
have the principal responsibility . . . [o]ur frozen pre-zygotes . . . [and] 
written consent of both us,” in determining that the parties intended the 
disposition of their frozen embryos to be a joint decision.50  Accordingly, the 
court concluded the “parties unequivocally manifest[ed] their mutual 
intention that in the present circumstances the pre-zygotes be donated for 
research to the IVF program.”51  In other words, the court honored the wishes 
the couple set forth in their informed consent forms.52 
In Roman v. Roman,53 a Texas case, Husband and Wife signed a clinic 
consent form indicating if they divorced, their frozen embryos were to be 
discarded.54  Following the harvesting of Wife’s eggs, but before the 
implantation procedure, Husband withdrew his consent to the use of the 
frozen embryos.55  Shortly thereafter, Husband filed for divorce, asking the 
 
 45. Kass, 696 N.E. at 178.  Wife’s difficulty getting pregnant was believed to be caused by 
“prenatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol.”  Id. 
 46. Id. at 178.  The Kasses’ disposition agreement form indicated that in the event they no 
longer wished to pursue a pregnancy their “frozen embryos may be examined by the IVF 
Program for biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research 
investigation as determined by the IVF Program.”  Id at 175. 
 47. Id. at 180. The Court indicated that parties to IVF should “think through possible 
contingencies and carefully specify their wishes in writing.”  Id.  Moreover, the Court noted 
that “[e]xplicit agreements avoid costly litigation in business transactions. They are all the 
more necessary and desirable in personal matters of reproductive choice, where the intangible 
costs of any litigation are simply incalculable.”  Id. 
 48. Id. at 180.   
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 181. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 182.   
 53. 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 1st 2006). 
 54. Id. at 42, 44.  The agreement stated: “If we are divorced or either of us files for divorce 
while any of our frozen embryos are still in the program, we hereby authorize and direct, 
jointly and individually, that one of the following actions be taken: the frozen embryo(s) shall 
be . . . Discarded.”  Id. at 44.  
 55. Id. at 42. 
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court to uphold the couple’s written agreement.56  Conversely, Wife argued 
that she wanted to use the frozen embryos in hopes of giving birth to a 
biological child.57 
The trial court awarded the embryos to Wife as part of a “just and right” 
division of community property.58  Husband appealed, arguing that the trial 
court’s award was in violation of the couple’s agreement, while Wife 
disputed “the agreement’s validity and the interpretation of the agreement.”59  
The Texas Court of Appeals conducted a thorough examination of state law 
from other jurisdictions, as well as a review of Texas assisted reproduction 
and gestational agreement statutes.60  It determined that an embryo 
agreement, which allows the parties to “voluntarily decide the disposition of 
frozen embryos” but is “subject to mutual change of mind,” does not violate 
the public policy of the State of Texas.61  
Next, the court determined whether the consent form was ambiguous.62  
Wife argued that “she understood the embryo agreement to apply to 
remaining embryos only after implantation had occurred”63 and that “she 
never agreed to destroy all of the embryos without an opportunity to get 
pregnant.”64  The court examined the document in its entirety and established 
“the parties’ embryo agreement was not ambiguous so as to preclude a 
meeting of the minds.”65  Of importance to the court was the provision that 
disposed of the remaining frozen embryos in the event one spouse died.66  
 
 56. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 43.  In addition, Wife “filed a counterclaim for divorce that 
included claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001 (West 2014) (“In a decree of divorce or annulment, 
the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems 
just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the 
marriage.”). 
 59. Roman, 193 S.W. 3d at 44–45.  Husband argued that the “agreement clearly provided 
for disposal of the frozen embryos in the case of divorce.”  Id. at 44.  
 60. Id. at 49. 
 61. Id.  The Court examined the following cases and statutes: Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 
588 (1993) (using a balancing approach to ultimately determine that Husband’s interest to 
avoid procreation outweighed Wife’s interest to donate the frozen embryos); Kass v. Kass, 
696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (deciding that the consent agreement should control); J.B. v. 
M.B., 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. 2000) (balancing the interests of the parties); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 
N.E.2d 1051, 1053–54 (Mass. 2000) (noting that the consent form did not express the 
intentions of Husband and holding the consent form is invalid); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 
261, 263 (Wash. 2002) (holding the consent agreement as valid); In Re Marriage of Witten, 
672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (using the contemporaneous mutual consent approach); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.701–702 (West 2001) (failing to determine the disposition of frozen 
embryos in the event of divorce or death); TEX . FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756(b)(4) (noting that 
for a gestational agreement to be deemed valid both parties must understand the agreement 
and enter into the agreement voluntarily).  
 62. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 50. 
 63. Id. at 52. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 53.  The court noted that “[i]n an unambiguous contract, [it] will not imply 
language, add to language, or interpret it other than pursuant to its plain meaning.”  Id. at 52.  
 66. Id. at 53. 
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For this section, the couple chose to give the remaining embryos to the 
surviving spouse.67  The court viewed this election as showing the couple 
was aware of their varying options to dispose of their embryos and had made 
their choices.68  
In Kass v. Kass and Roman v. Roman, the courts determined the contracts 
entered into were legally binding agreements and ruled accordingly.  
However, not every signed clinic consent form will pass the courts’ muster.  
Specifically, in A.Z. v. B.Z.,69 a Massachusetts couple signed a form each 
time the wife underwent egg retrieval.70  Each form was the same and 
outlined the process, cost, benefits, and risks of the IVF procedure.71  The 
forms also allowed the couple to determine the disposition of their frozen 
embryos should a variety of circumstances arise by opting to donate, destroy, 
or write in their own option for each listed incident.72  
At the time the first form was filled out and completed, both Husband 
and Wife were present.73  The form indicated in the event of separation, the 
embryos would be conferred upon the wife for future implantation.74  
However, subsequent forms signed by Husband were blank at the time of his 
signing and Wife filled in the information regarding the disposition of the 
eggs after Husband signed.75  Each form had the same disposition in regards 
to separation as the first one did, returning the frozen embryos to Wife for 
implantation.76  
At the time of divorce, Wife sought the use of the final vial of frozen 
embryos which coincided with one of the blank consent forms Husband 
signed.77  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined the form 
did not represent the intent of the parties and accordingly, did not enforce the 
form against them.78  The court deemed the form invalid based on both the 
primary purpose of the form and the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the form.79  
In reaching its decision invalidating the form, the court asserted three 
reasons.  First, it determined the form was “intended only to define the 
 
 67. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 53. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (2000). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  The listed contingencies included: “‘wife or donor’ reaching normal menopause or 
age forty-five years; preembyros no longer being healthy; ‘one of us dying;’ ‘[s]hould we 
become separated;’ ‘[s]hould we both die.’”  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1054.  “Sometimes a consent form was signed by the husband while he and his 
wife were traveling to the IVF clinic; other forms were signed before the two went to the IVF 
clinic.”  Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1056. 
 79. Id. at 1057. 
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donors’ relationship as a unit with the clinic” and not to act as a legally 
binding contract.80  Second, the court stressed  the form did not “contain a 
duration provision” and refused to “assume that the donors intended the 
consent form to govern the disposition of the frozen preembryos four years 
after it was executed.”81  And third, the form did not define the term “should 
we become separated.”82  Moreover, the court found that since the husband 
signed blank forms, the forms did not represent his true intention.83 
C. CONTEMPORANEOUS MUTUAL CONSENT APPROACH 
While the courts in the aforementioned cases analyzed the parties’ 
contracts, other courts have adopted a different approach based on 
contemporaneous mutual consent.84  This approach proposes that “no 
embryo should be used by either partner, donated to another patient, used in 
research, or destroyed without the contemporaneous mutual consent of the 
couple that created the embryo.”85  This approach does not view prior 
agreements as binding contracts if one of the partners subsequently changes 
his or her mind regarding the disposition of the embryos.86  In order to 
proceed forward, the couple must make a mutual decision or the embryos 
will be kept frozen in storage until an agreement can be reached.87  
In re Marriage of Witten88 exemplifies the contemporaneous mutual 
consent model.  In this case, a couple from Iowa signed informed consent 
documents prior to undergoing IVF.89  The subsequent embryo transfers 
proved unsuccessful and the couple later filed for divorce.90  The wife 
adamantly opposed the destruction of, or the donation of, the frozen 
embryos, wishing only to have the embryos implanted in herself or a 
 
 80. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1056–57.  The Court found that the primary purpose of the consent 
form was to “explain to the donors the benefits and risks of freezing, and to record the donors’ 
desires for disposition of the frozen embryos at the time the form is executed in order to 
provide the clinic with guidance if the donors (as a unit) no longer wish to use the frozen 
embryos.”  Id.  
 81. Id.  Given the donors’ change in circumstances among other factors, the court refused 
to enforce this four-year-old agreement.  Id. 
 82. Id. at 1057.  The court did not want to assume that separated and divorce meant the 
same thing.  Id.  
 83. Id.  The court went on to say that had the couple entered into an unambiguous 
agreement it “would not enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to become a 
parent against his or her will.”  Id.  
 84. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 778 (Iowa 2003) (comparing the 
contractual and the contemporaneous mutual consent approaches, the court noted that the two 
models “share an underlying premise: ‘decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos 
belong to the couple that created the embryo, with each partner entitled to an equal say in how 
the embryos should be disposed’”). 
 85. Id. at 778.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  The court indicated that by “[p]reserving the status quo, it makes it possible for the 
partners to reach an agreement at a later time.”  Id.  
 88. 672 N.W.2d at 778. 
 89. Id. at 771. 
 90. Id. 
MAROLD MACRO 3.31 2.01 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2014  4:33 PM 
190 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
surrogate mother.91  The husband wanted the frozen embryos to be donated 
to another couple.92  The Supreme Court of Iowa applied the 
contemporaneous mutual consent approach and held that “agreements 
entered into at the time in vitro fertilization is commenced are enforceable 
and binding on the parties ‘subject to the right of either party to change his 
or her mind about disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any 
stored embryo.’”93 
D. THE BALANCING OR BEST INTEREST APPROACH 
While the contractual and contemporaneous mutual consent approaches 
discussed above both look to the contract, the balancing or best interest 
approach looks exclusively at the desires of the parties.  This method takes 
into consideration the wishes of both parties and the burdens that will be 
imposed upon the individuals given the court’s decision and weighs them 
against one another.  This approach allows the courts to take into account the 
constitutional rights of the couple to procreate or avoid procreation.  One’s 
right to procreate stems from Skinner v. Oklahoma,94 where the United States 
Supreme Court indicated one’s right to procreation is “one of the basic civil 
rights of man” and “procreation [is] fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.”95  On the other hand, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,96 the Court 
stated one’s right to privacy included one’s right “to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting 
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”97 
Focused on the Constitutional issues raised by Skinner and Eisenstadt, 
the Supreme Court of Tennessee adopted the balancing approach in Davis v. 
Davis.98  In that case, the couple underwent IVF and had their remaining 
embryos cryogenically preserved.99  However, neither party signed an 
informed consent form.100  Unfortunately, the procedures did not result in a 
 
 91. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 772–73.  At trial, Wife testified that if 
implantation of the embryos resulted in a successful pregnancy, “she would afford [Husband] 
the opportunity to exercise parental rights or to have his rights terminated.”  Id. at 772. 
 92. Id. at 773. 
 93. Id. at 782.  In deciding to follow the contemporaneous mutual consent model, the court 
found that “judicial enforcement of an agreement between a couple regarding their future 
family and reproductive choices would be against the public policy of this state.”  Id.   
 94. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).   
 95. Id. at 541.   
 96. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 97. Id. at 453.  
 98. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 99. Id. at 592.  Early in their attempts to have a baby, Mrs. Davis suffered from five tubal 
pregnancies.  Id. at 591.  Following the fifth tubal pregnancy, Mrs. Davis “chose to have her 
left fallopian tube ligated, thus leaving her without functional fallopian tubes by which to 
conceive naturally.”  Id.  The couple then attempted adoption, but “at the last minute, the 
child’s birth mother changed her mind about putting the child up for adoption.”  Id. 
 100. Id. at 592.  There is no indication that the couple “ever considered the implications of 
storage beyond the few months it would take to transfer the remaining ‘frozen embryos’ if 
MAROLD MACRO 3.31 2.01 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2014  4:33 PM 
Summer 2014]     DIVISION OF FROZEN EMBRYOS IN DIVORCE 191 
pregnancy and Husband filed for divorce.101  The Wife wished to donate the 
frozen embryos and Husband was “adamantly opposed to such donation” 
and preferred to discard the frozen embryos.102 
Applying the balancing approach, the court weighed the parties’ 
competing interests against one another.103  On the one hand, the court 
determined that if the embryos were donated, Husband would be forced to 
become a parent, thrusting tremendous psychological and financial 
consequences upon him.104  The court took into account Husband’s traumatic 
childhood and how his parents’ divorce caused his mother to have a 
meltdown, resulting with Husband living in a boys’ home and having little 
relationship with either of his parents.105  Moreover, Husband opposed 
donation of the frozen embryos because the receiving couple could possibly 
get a divorce.106  Conversely, the court examined the efforts Wife put forth 
in undergoing IVF treatment and how disposing of the embryos would render 
her endeavors futile.107  
After carefully weighing the impact the decision could have on both 
parties, the court concluded that Wife’s interest was not as significant as 
Husband’s.108  However, the court did note “the case would be closer if 
[Wife] were seeking to use the preembryos herself, but only if she could not 
achieve parenthood by any other reasonable means.”109  The court concluded 
“the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail” as long as the 
 
necessary.  There was no discussion, let alone an agreement, concerning disposition in the 
event of a contingency such as divorce.”  Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 590.  At the trial court level, Wife requested that the frozen embryos be awarded 
to her “with the intent to have them transferred to her own uterus, in a post divorce effort to 
become pregnant.”  Id. at 589.  Husband wished that they stayed frozen until he made a 
decision as to whether or not he wanted to become a father.  Id.  By the time the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee heard the case, both Husband and Wife had changed their minds to reflect 
their above-mentioned positions.  Id. at 590.  
 103. Id. at 603. 
 104. Id. at 603. 
 105. Id. at 603–04.  Husband only saw his father three times following his parent’s divorce 
and “had monthly visits with his mother.”  Id. at 603.  Husband indicated that “it was 
especially hard to leave his mother after each monthly visit. He clearly feels that he has 
suffered because of his lack of opportunity to establish a relationship with his parents and 
particularly because of the absence of his father.”  Id. at 604. 
 106. Id. at 604. 
 107. Id.  Wife endured six unsuccessful IVF attempts.  Id. at 591.  Prior to each procedure, 
Wife endured “the month of subcutaneous injections necessary to stimulate her ovaries to 
produce ova. She was anesthetized five times for the aspiration procedure to be performed. 
Forty-eight to seventy-two hours after each aspiration, she returned for transfer back to her 
uterus, only to receive a negative pregnancy test result each time.”  Id. at 591–92.  Moreover, 
the couple spent $35,000 in IVF procedures.  Id. at 591.  
 108. Id. at 604.  The court noted that if Wife were permitted to donate the embryos Husband 
“would face a lifetime of either wondering about his parental status or knowing about his 
parental status but having no control over it.”  Id. 
 109. Id.  “If no other reasonable alternatives exist, than the argument in favor of using the 
preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered.” Id.  
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opposing party has a “reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood” by 
other means.110 
Nine years following the Davis decision, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey applied the balancing approach to once again weigh the competing 
interests of donating against discarding the embryos.  In J.B. v. M.B.,111 the 
couple underwent IVF because Wife had a medical condition that prohibited 
her from becoming pregnant.112  The IVF resulted in eleven pre-embryos, 
four of which were “transferred to [Wife] and the remaining seven were 
cryopreserved.”113  This procedure resulted in a pregnancy, and Wife gave 
birth to the couple’s daughter.114  However, later that year Wife filed for 
divorce and sought a court order regarding the remaining frozen embryos.115   
In this case, Wife wanted to discard the remaining frozen embryos, while 
Husband wished to donate them to an infertile couple.116  The trial court 
weighed the couple’s arguments and determined, since Husband was not 
infertile, he would be able to have children in the future and only wanted to 
donate the frozen embryos, while the wife’s desire not to have children was 
“the greater interest and should prevail.”117 
On appeal, Husband “argued that his constitutional right to procreate had 
been violated” by the trial court’s decision.118  The Court of Appeal weighed 
Wife’s right not to procreate against Husband’s right to procreate and found 
that discarding the frozen embryos would not affect Husband’s right to 
procreate because he was perfectly capable of fathering a child in the 
future.119  Furthermore, allowing the donation of the embryos against Wife’s 
wishes would violate her right not to procreate because she would be “forced 
to allow strangers to raise that child.”120 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the rule gleaned 
from Davis v. Davis and found that Wife, “the party wishing to avoid 
procreation,” should not be forced to become a parent against her wishes.121  
 
 110. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.  However, the court did note that “an agreement regarding 
disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies (such as death of 
one or more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals, or abandonment of the program) 
should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progenitors.”  Id. at 597.  
 111. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 112. Id. at 709.  
 113. Id. at 710.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. Wife indicated that she “agreed to preserve the preembryos for our use in the context 
of an intact family,” and that she and Husband never discussed what would happen to the 
frozen embryos should they divorce.  Id.  Conversely, Husband responds that the couple 
discussed the issue and decided that “any unused preembryos would not be destroyed, but 
would be used by his wife or donated to infertile couples.”  Id. 
 117. Id. at 711. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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Moreover, the court “express[ed] no opinion in respect of a case in which a 
party who has become infertile seeks use of stored embryos against the 
wishes of his or her partner, noting only that the possibility of adoption also 
may be a consideration, among others, in the court’s assessment.”122  
While Davis v. Davis and A.B. v. M.B. both found in favor of the party 
seeking to avoid procreation, they did leave the door open for the possibility 
of an infertile party to prevail over the party not wishing to be a parent.  
However, a court did not seize this opportunity until Reber v. Reiss123 in 
2012.  In this case, Wife was diagnosed with breast cancer and “[a]s a result 
of the diagnosis and proposed recommended cancer treatments, the parties 
were advised to undergo IVF to preserve Wife’s ability to conceive a 
child.”124  The couple underwent IVF, resulting in thirteen preembryos 
utilizing Wife’s eggs and Husband’s sperm.125  Following the IVF process, 
Wife endured “extensive breast cancer treatments.”126  Nearly two years 
following the IVF procedure, Husband filed for divorce, and wife sought “all 
thirteen embryos for implantation.”127  
The trial court determined that while the party wishing to avoid 
procreation ordinarily prevails, “Wife’s inability to achieve biological 
parenthood without the use of the preembryos is an interest which outweighs 
Husband’s desire to avoid procreation.”128  Accordingly, the trial court 
awarded the pre-embryos to Wife.129  Husband appealed, arguing that the 
“trial court erred in finding that Wife’s interests in procreating outweighed 
Husband’s interests to avoid unwanted procreation.”130 
On review, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania engaged in a very fact 
specific balancing approach to determine the disposition of the couple’s 
frozen embryos.131  For the Wife, the court reviewed trial testimony 
regarding her belief that she could no longer have children and the fact that 
the only reason she underwent IVF was because she was diagnosed with 
breast cancer.132  In regards to Husband’s arguments that Wife could adopt 
or become a foster parent, the court indicated “simply because adoption or 
foster parenting may be available to Wife, it does not mean that such options 
 
 122. M.B., 783 A.2d at 720. 
 123. 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. 2012). 
 124. Id. at 1132.  “To accommodate the IVF process, Wife deferred the commencement of 
her cancer treatment for several months.”  Id. at 1132–33.  
 125. Id. at 1133. 
 126. Id.  Wife’s cancer treatment included “two surgeries, eight rounds of chemo therapy 
and 37 rounds of radiation.”  Id. 
 127. Id.  Following the couple’s separation, Husband entered into a relationship with another 
woman and eighteen months later “Husband’s biological son was born.”  Id.  
 128. Id. at 1134. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 1136.  
 132. Id. at 1137.  “Wife has undergone testing with regard to her ability to have children 
since her recovery from cancer and testified that she ‘was lead [sic] to believe that [she] cannot 
have children.”  Id. 1133.  
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should be given equal weight in a balancing test.”133  Moreover, the court 
discussed the difficulties a single, older woman with health complications 
could face when trying to adopt.134  The court concluded “Wife’s compelling 
interest in using the preembryos include the fact that these preembryos are 
the option that provides her with what is likely her only chance at genetic 
parenthood and her most reasonable chance for parenthood at all.”135 
For the Husband, the court considered “that he opposes Wife’s use of 
these preembryos for procreation because he, himself, was adopted and he 
would not want any of his children not to know his or her biological 
father.”136  However, Wife indicated Husband can be involved in the child’s 
life if he wishes, thus “alleviating his concerns about the child not being able 
to find out about his or her biological father.”137  Another argument Husband 
asserted was that a potential child would be a financial burden to him.  
Countering that argument, the appellate court pointed to Wife’s testimony at 
the trial that she would “do her best to assure that Husband never has to pay 
to support the child or children.”138  
Accordingly, the court determined  since the couple “never made an 
agreement prior to undergoing IVF, and these preembryos are likely wife’s 
only opportunity to achieve biological parenthood and her best chance to 
achieve parenthood at all, [it] agree[d] with the trial court that the balancing 
of the interests tips in Wife’s favor.”139 
IV.THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH FRAMEWORK 
Following the above discussion of the state statutes and the cases decided 
under the contractual, contemporaneous mutual consent, and balancing 
approaches, we now turn our attention to the pros and cons of each of the 
aforementioned frameworks.  
 
 133. Reiss, 42 A.3d at 1138.  
 134. Id. at 1139; See Can a Single Person Adopt? http://www.parents.com/parenting/ 
adoption/facts/can-a-single-person-adopt/ (last visited May 8, 2013) (expressing the potential 
difficulties a single adoptive parent may face).  
Agencies have varying policies in dealing with single applicants. Some don’t 
accept them at all. Others may put your application and request for a home 
study (a family assessment) on the back burner while waiting to find a couple 
who wants to adopt. The children offered to you may have disabilities that you 
cannot handle, or be 12 years old when you requested a toddler. If you pursue 
independent adoption (a path to adoption with no agency involvement), birth 
mothers may balk when they learn you are single. 
Id.  
 135. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1140.  Wife testified that “I always wanted to have children. I 
wouldn’t have gone through . . . the whole IVF thing if I hadn’t wanted children ….  And I 
wanted that experience of being pregnant and that closeness, that bond.”  Id. at 1138.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1141. 
 139. Id. 
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A. STATE STATUTES 
While few states have implemented legislation particularly on point to 
the disposition of frozen embryos at the time of divorce, those that have 
provide little if any direction to the court, thus “act[ing] to prohibit universal 
and consecutive outcomes between states.”140  From Louisiana finding 
frozen embryos are people,141 to North Dakota’s problematic reading of 
potentially forcing individuals to become parents,142 the statutes vary 
considerably from state to state and do not afford clear-cut and concise rules.  
However, the statutes do offer some positives that are worth noting.  The 
California statute seems to provide the most incentive for IVF clinic doctors 
to provide their clients with disposition agreements, since it is the only 
statute that has any consequence for the doctors.143  Moreover, it lists specific 
possibilities for the various contingencies, offering clients ideas of how they 
would like to dispose of their embryos.144  Nonetheless, none of the statutes 
make filling out a disposition agreement mandatory, so couples who may be 
running short on time or who are overwhelmed by the volume of the forms 
may simply chose not to do so. 
B. CONTRACTUAL APPROACH 
For those individuals who fill out a disposition agreement, the 
contractual method, which holds agreements regarding the disposition of 
frozen embryos valid and binding, is alluring “because it validates the 
purpose and binding nature of contracts.”145  If couples know their 
agreements will be enforced by the courts, they may be more inclined to take 
the time and make a thoughtful and informed decision regarding the 
disposition of their frozen embryos in the event of death, divorce, or some 
other extenuating circumstance.146  Proponents of the contractual approach 
believe enforcing contracts is an efficient way to resolve legal disputes.147 
However, opponents of the contractual approach find holding clinic 
consent forms as valid, legally binding agreements proves to be problematic 
for a number of reasons.  First, the disposition agreement is often hidden 
amongst a myriad of forms, including information regarding storage, costs, 
risks, and benefits of the procedure.148  These forms often convey “their 
 
 140. Shelly R. Petralia, Resolving Disputes Over Excess Frozen Embryos Through the 
Confines of Property and Contract Law, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 126 (2002-03).  
 141. L.A. STAT. ANN. 9.123 (West 1986). 
 142. N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 14-20-64(1) (West 2005). 
 143. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 125315(a) (West 2004). 
 144. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 125315(b)(3) (West 2004). 
 145. Kimberly Berg, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 506, 514 (2006).  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 515. 
 148. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are 
Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57, 67 (2011).  See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 
174, 176 (N.Y. 1998) (noting that the Kasses “signed four consent forms”). 
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information using highly technical language in densely packed, single 
spaced documents that may not even clearly delineate the different topics.”149  
Even if a couple is given a separate form regarding the disposition of their 
frozen embryos, it is still one of many forms the couple has to sign, 
consequently diluting their perceived power of the pen.150  The presentation 
of the countless forms coupled with the contemplation of death and divorce 
in a time of supposed happiness for the parents-to-be, makes it nearly 
impossible to form a thoughtful and informed decision about where, or to 
whom, your embryos will go to in the event one of the contingencies should 
occur.151  
Moreover, if the couple is able to rationally dictate the parties’ desires, 
it does not eliminate the fact that making such a decision is quite difficult.  
The party is asked, sans frills or sugar coating, what they would like to do 
with their potentially unborn child, and are then presented with a series of 
options or a fill in the blank option.  Research conducted in 2010 by the 
Department of Social Medicine at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill indicates “patients feel ‘anguished’ and ‘agonized’ over the decision 
about what to do with frozen embryos.”152  Accordingly, those parties who 
had successful IVF procedures resulting in a child, no longer in need of their 
frozen embryos “could not identify a preferred disposition option for their 
excess embryos.”153  The research concluded that the informed consent forms 
should be occasionally reviewed, “with serious discussions about disposition 
after childbearing is complete.”154  By advising couples to revisit their forms 
and assess disposition following changes in circumstances, in addition to the 
emotional turmoil said forms create, this research suggests the clinic consent 
forms should not yield a legally binding contractual agreement.   
C. CONTEMPORANEOUS MUTUAL CONSENT APPROACH 
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach, like the contractual 
approach, upholds disposition agreements made by the couple.  However, 
this approach allows for the parties to change their minds after the agreement 
has been made.  Thus, only allowing the frozen embryos to be disposed of in 
a manner agreed exclusively upon by both individuals.  
Proponents of the approach find enforcing contracts “respects the 
decision-making authority of the persons the partners were at the time the 
agreement was made,” but fails to take into account “the individual’s 
 
 149. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176 (indicating that two of the forms signed by the Kasses 
“consist[ed] of 12 single spaced type written pages”). 
 150. See Forman, supra note 148 (noting that the cryopreservation disposition agreement is 
just “one of many the patients must wade through prior to treatment”). 
 151. Forman, supra note 148.  
 152. A.D. Lyerly et al., Decisional Conflict and the Disposition of Frozen Embryos: 
Implications of Informed Consent, 26 HUM. REPROD. 646, 646 (2011).  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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evolving personality.”155  Accordingly, the contemporaneous mutual consent 
approach honors the views and wishes of the “new person” who exists 
today.156  Moreover, supporters of this approach view the concept of 
changing one’s mind regarding the disposition of his or her frozen embryos 
as an inalienable right, making the relinquishment of the right unenforceable 
if the individual changes his or her mind.157  Proponents also analogize 
disposition agreements to promises to marry or never divorce, both of which 
have been struck down as unenforceable in most states.158  Lastly, the 
contemporaneous mutual consent model does not force an individual to 
become a biological parent against his or her wishes.159  This approach 
recognizes the emotional turmoil some may experience through becoming a 
parent or donating the embryos and emphasizes the opposing party’s 
Constitutional right of privacy.  
Nonetheless, critics of this approach find that leaving the embryos in a 
state of limbo until the parties can reach an agreement has its downsides as 
well.  Unlike the balancing approach, this approach ignores the constitutional 
rights of both of the parties to procreate or avoid procreation, consequently 
discounting their individual preferences.  In addition, the party who does not 
want to destroy the embryos is forced to pay the storage costs, “effectively 
punish[ing] that party for pursuing those rights.”160  Moreover, this approach 
undercuts the contractual nature of disposition agreements and offers no 
incentive for parties to take these forms seriously if they know they are 
allowed to change their minds down the road.161  Lastly, “the viability of the 
preembryos cannot be guaranteed indefinitely,”162 hence the party wishing 
to destroy the embryos will eventually get his or her way if the parties are 
unable to reach an agreement before the frozen embryos cease to be viable. 
D. THE BALANCING APPROACH 
Unlike the contractual and contemporaneous mutual consent methods, 
the balancing approach weighs the benefits and burdens of the parties’ 
 
 155. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable 
Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 91–92 (1999).  But see 
Diane K. Yang, What’s Mine is Mine, But What’s Yours Should Also Be Mine: An Analysis of 
State Statutes that Mandate the Implantation of Frozen Embryos, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 627 
(2002) (arguing for a contractual approach).  “Although the individual’s circumstances and 
state of mind prior to and after IVF may drastically change, human indecisiveness and 
uncertainty are variables in any contract.”  Id.  
 156. Coleman, supra note 155, at 91-92. 
 157. Coleman, supra note 155, at 91-92. 
 158. Coleman, supra note 155, at 91-92. 
 159. Coleman, supra note 155, at 91-92. 
 160. Jessica L. Lambert, Developing a Legal Framework for Resolving Disputes Between 
“Adoptive Parents” of Frozen Embryos: A Comparison of Resolutions of Divorce Disputes 
Between Progenitors, 49 B.C. L. REV. 529, 563 (2008).  
 161. Sara D. Peterson, Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos Upon Divorce: A Contractual 
Approach Aimed at Preserving Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065, 1080 (2003).  
 162. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992). 
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requests against one another in determining who should be awarded custody 
of the frozen embryos.  Proponents of this method believe it “acknowledges 
that a divorce is a dissolution of the marital unit and involves the divergent 
interests of the parties.”163  Additionally, this approach emphasizes the great 
efforts courts have undertaken to consider one’s Constitutional right to either 
procreate or avoid procreation. 
Critics of the balancing approach find it provides little guidance to the 
courts, forcing them to decide each dispute on a case by case basis.164  Others 
believe this method “does not sufficiently protect procreative liberty because 
it undermines freedom of contract.”165  Moreover, some find this approach 
has become a “predictable and arguably pretextual practice,” since the party 
wishing to avoid parenthood always prevails, save the exception one party is 
infertile.166  However, following Reiber v. Reiss, the pretextual argument will 
undoubtedly carry less weight if more and more individuals are able to take 
advantage of the infertility exception.  
V.CONCLUSION: THE BEST APPROACH – ONE WHERE 
[IN]FERTILITY MATTERS 
Upon reviewing the alarming fertility statistics presented in the 
introduction of this article, it only seems fitting that fertility, often times the 
main reason a couple undergoes IVF, should guide decisions regarding the 
disposition of frozen embryos at the time of divorce.  This proposed method, 
a hybrid of the three approaches used by the courts, combines the aforesaid 
methods by holding a disposition agreement valid and binding, unless one 
member of the party, wishing to use the frozen embryos for procreation, is 
able to prove that his or her infertility would make it impossible for him or 
her to have a child.  
Accordingly, this approach harmonizes the three judicial approaches.  It 
honors the contractual nature of disposition agreements by treating them as 
binding contracts.  It appreciates the changes in circumstances stressed by 
the contemporaneous mutual consent approach by taking into account 
whether an individual can achieve parenthood with the changes that divorce 
will bring.  And lastly, it respects the constitutional rights the balancing 
approach seeks to uphold by awarding those individuals who are unable to 
have children a greater interest in their frozen embryos.  
While some may consider that this approach benefits only women, this 
method is actually completely gender neutral.  Fertility statistics provide 
“among couples who are infertile, about forty percent of cases are 
exclusively due to female infertility, forty percent exclusively to male 
 
 163. Lambert, supra note 160, at 564. 
 164. Tracy Frazier, Of Property and Procreation: Oregon’s Place in the National Debate 
Over Frozen Embryo Disputes, 88 OR. L. REV. 931, 946–47 (2009).  
 165. Berg, supra note 145, at 517. 
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MAROLD MACRO 3.31 2.01 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2014  4:33 PM 
Summer 2014]     DIVISION OF FROZEN EMBRYOS IN DIVORCE 199 
infertility, and ten percent involve problems with both partners.  In the 
remaining ten percent, the cause is unknown.”167  Accordingly, infertility 
affects men and woman equally.  While men are obviously unable to carry a 
child, many women affected by infertility are also unable to achieve a 
successful pregnancy by carrying a child.  Fortunately for both sexes, the 
option of using a gestational carrier is a successful way to bring a child into 
this world using the frozen embryos.168 
The main pitfall to this approach arises when both parties can prove their 
infertility and both wish to be awarded the frozen embryos.  Two possible 
solutions exist, each with pros and cons.  The first solution is to “gestate the 
child and then hold a custody hearing after the child’s birth.”169  This post 
gestation approach will undoubtedly move the couple into the world of 
family law and the best interest of the child standard used in child custody 
proceedings.170  When dealing with frozen embryos, courts have declined to 
use this standard because it does not consider the frozen embryo to be a child 
in need of the protections the best interest standard takes into account.171   
The second solution is to divide the embryos between the couple.172  This 
option will give each party the opportunity to have his or her own child, as 
opposed to potentially just one with the added bonus of a custody dispute, as 
proposed by the first resolution.  However, if only a few embryos remain, 
dividing them will diminish each individual’s opportunity of being able to 
have a child because each person will have fewer chances to try and achieve 
a successful implantation.  An additional issue ensues when there are an odd 
number of frozen embryos.  What happens to the odd numbered embryo?  
Application of the balancing approach?  Destruction?  Moreover, the 
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division of the embryos, like other tangible assets in a marriage, raises the 
issue of whether frozen embryos are in fact personal property, a hotly 
debated topic outside the scope of this article.  
While a fertility conscious analysis, as evidenced above, has its pitfalls, 
unlike other approaches, it seeks to simultaneously honor one’s contractual 
and Constitutional rights.  With the recent decision of Reiber v. Reiss, it 
appears courts are interested in fertility issues and have essentially placed 
one’s inability to procreate above one’s wishes to avoid procreation.  In light 
of that focus, courts and legislatures should consider a fertility conscious 
analysis when determining the disposition of frozen embryos at the time of 
divorce.  
 
 
 
